Is Homo Hierarchicus?
Fluid Signs: Being a Person the Tamil Way by E. Valentine Daniel; The Untouchable as Himself: Ideology, Identity and Pragmatism among the Lucknow Chamars by Ravindra S. Khare; The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism by Ashis Nandy
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When it first appeared in English translation in 1970, Louis Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus seemed to constitute a major invitation to think about South Asian society in a new way. The book and its arguments have inspired many debates and polemics, and simply for the grandeur of its aims it has yet to be surpassed. Yet, like many great works, it appears now not to have been the inspiration for a new way of thinking but the swan song for an older one.

There are two reasons for making this apparently perverse suggestion. The first is that Homo Hierarchicus is likely to have been the last major work to make caste the central problematic of Indian society. In this regard it completes a Western journey in the social scientific invention of India whose immediate roots are in Max Weber’s The Religion of India (1958[1909]) but whose deeper roots go back to the Orientalist and proto-Orientalist conception of Indian society. The second reason is that in placing hierarchy, as a concept, at the heart of a “sociology for India,” Dumont also composed an elegy and a deeply Western trope for a whole way of thinking about India, in which it represents the extremes of the human capability to fetishize inequality. Though Dumont regarded his work as an effort to capture the radical differentness of caste, and thus of India, it is also subject to the Orientalist tendency to make one place or society grist for the conceptual mill of another.

There are two signs of liberation from this sort of Orientalism. The first is the multiplication of “anthropologies” of India, in many of which caste (and its conceptual leash—hierarchy) play an appropriately restricted role. The second symptom is the steady increase in works that deal with self-making and culture-making in India, without capitulating to the hegemony of hierarchy as a dominant image. The three books under review in this essay are important efforts to capture aspects of self, society and culture in India, and are crucial steps forward in the deconstruction of caste as the central problematic of Indian society, and of hierarchy as its most compelling trope. All three are by native South Asians, two of whom (both anthropologists) teach...
the battle over selfhood

In Ashis Nandy's *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism*, we find a major new critical voice in the analysis of colonialism as a cultural, epistemological, and psychological battleground. Nandy, trained originally as a psychologist (with a special interest in politics), has recently emerged as a major critic of modern science, bureaucracy, and politics. In particular, he has come to be associated with an activist effort to formulate “alternative” sciences to those of the dominant post-Enlightenment Euro-American paradigm and has begun to generate a radical (though distinctly non-Marxist) critique of the relationship between states and culture, with particular reference to India. In all these regards, he stands at the center of a group of theorists and writers based principally in Delhi (including J. P. S. Uberoi, Rajni Kothari, Shiv Vishvanathan, and the members of the collective centered around the activist journal *Lokayan*) who are engaged in constructing a powerful alternative to current ideologies about the connection between culture, science, and politics in modern life.

Though there are many strands to this critique and Nandy represents only one voice among others, central to his own contribution is the effort to provide a moral and political basis for the resistance of marginal, local, indigenous ways of knowing and living to the forces of the modern state and its cultural apparatus. Nandy’s is notably not a relativist voice, committed to the preservation of local systems of knowledge simply because they are there and they are different. What he proposes is an alternative set of “universalisms,” emerging out of the traditional knowledges of civilizations such as India, which can team up with what he calls the “other” West to contest the scientism, rationalism, and technologized universalism that threaten the lives and livelihoods of many groups in the world. *The Intimate Enemy* represents one strand in his larger project, which concerns the battle over selfhood that developed in the colonial context in India. For anthropologists, the great significance of this book is that it reminds us that the “selves” we study in the non-Western world belong to an endangered species.

The *Intimate Enemy* consists of two long essays, the first on the psychology of colonialism and the second on what Nandy calls the “uncolonized mind.” These essays are preceded by a preface in which Nandy sets forth his assumptions and objectives. He says that his aim is to tell the story of the second colonization, the phase of colonialism that “colonizes minds in addition to bodies” and forces fundamental changes in the cultural priorities of the colonized. He also states his intention to document resistance to this second colonialism, in the form of concepts and values by which the non-West turns the West into something manageable. In this resistance, there are very complex alliances between levels of consciousness in both the West and the non-West:

If there is the non-West which constantly invites one to be Western and to defeat the West on the strength of one’s acquired Westernness—there is the non-West’s construction of the West which invites one to be true to the West’s other self and to the non-West which is in alliance with that other self [p. xiii].

Nandy regards the two essays that comprise his book as a tribute to those who refuse to play the cultural and psychological game by its official rules and “who construct a West which allows them to live with the alternative West, while resisting the loving embrace of the West’s dominant self” (p. xiv). In Nandy’s view, the choices made and positions taken by actors in colonial India, which looked like collaboration or weak-mindedness, may turn out to be part of a moral and cognitive venture against oppression.

Nandy’s first and more successful essay is “The Psychology of Colonialism: Sex, Age and Ideology in British India.” This essay builds on the work of Fanon, Mannoni, Cesaire, and other critics of the psychology of colonialism. But it also offers some subtle new twists. In it he argues
that at the heart of mature colonialism lies a contract between ruler and ruled that is essentially psychological. This contract involves the centralization of previously marginal themes and the peripheralization of previously core themes in both cultures. In the new configuration, a particular historical conception of adult masculinity pushes off the stage other values built around femininity, childhood, and old age.

Nandy’s formulation of this new colonial psychology is put briefly, even elliptically, and it can be summarized as follows. Nandy asserts that in the new colonial cultural framework of British India, there was a tendency to lump together and devalue all forms of androgyny and oppose them to undifferentiated masculinity. On the side of the ruled, there was a split in the Victorian conception of masculinity, with the lower classes expected to act out their manliness by demonstrating their sexual prowess and the upper classes through sexual distance, abstinence, and self-control. On the Indian side, this contract meant the acceptance of the terms of the ruled even in efforts to oppose them. Thus, in many pre-Gandhian protest movements, aggression, achievement, control, and competition became the “final differentiae of manliness” (p. 9). This is for Nandy one of the central wounds of colonialism—the temptation to the ruled to fight their rulers within the psychological limits set by the latter.

On the matter of age and colonialism, Nandy is both more original and more explicit. He notes (drawing on Phillipe Ariès) that colonial culture draws on that modern conception of childhood which, starting in the 17th century, ceases to regard children as smaller versions of adults and begins to see them as inferior versions of adults. But here too Nandy makes an interesting distinction between the colonial conceptions of the “childish” Indian and of the “childlike” Indian, the interplay between the two giving colonial culture in India its distinctive flavor. The “childlike” Indian was portrayed as capable of being reformed, civilized, taught, and trained, whereas the “childish” Indian was regarded as savage, unpredictable, ungrateful, disloyal, and incorrigible. Here, as elsewhere in colonial ideology, opposed notions coexist at each other’s service.

The other aspect of the relationship between colonialism and age pertains to the matter of old age. Though Nandy’s argument here is rather cryptic, its main thrust is clear enough. Just as contemporary Judeo-Christian culture had tended to devalue old age and see the elderly as either decrepit or sinful, Indian civilization was seen as senile and corrupt, though ancient.

Many of Nandy’s general comments about the link between sex, age, and colonial ideology are hard to assess because they are put briefly, polemically, and often in extreme form, as he himself notes. But the evidence for these arguments emerges in his deft sketches of several sorts of critical response to the colonial devaluation of androgyny, femininity, childhood, and physical infirmity.

One of Nandy’s more provocative observations is that because of scale and demography, the long-term cultural damage that colonialism did to British society was greater than what it did to Indians. The cultural pathologies associated with the making of a colonial culture in England were due to the fact that it brought into prominence those parts of British culture that were least tender and humane, and that it institutionalized what E. M. Forster called the “undeveloped heart.” It also created in the colonies an escape valve for the misfits of the new industrial order and created a false sense of cultural homogeneity among groups and classes in Britain. But the pathology at home was mostly in the domain of psychological values. Victorian political culture “de-emphasized speculation, intellect and caritas as feminine, and justified a limited cultural role for women—and femininity—by holding that the softer side of human nature was irrelevant to the public sphere” (p. 32). It also, according to Nandy, enshrined “in the name of such values as competition, achievement, control, and productivity—new forms of institutionalized violence and ruthless Social Darwinism” (p. 32).

Nandy presents interesting vignettes of the following Englishmen: Kipling, whom he sees as the classic example of the self-hatred and ego constriction that go with being an apologist for colonialism; George Orwell, who developed into a brilliant critic of just those aspects of the
psychology of colonialism and totalitarianism to which Nandy himself is opposed; Oscar Wilde, whose life Nandy reads as a statement of the involute, “criminal,” “pathological” and self-destructive turn in some of those who found the atmosphere of late Victorianism suffocating; and a minor figure called C. F. Andrews, whom Nandy treats as exemplary of reformers like Sister Nivedita, Annie Besant, and Mira Behn. This latter group found in India models of religiosity, knowledge, and social intervention that permitted them to criticize their own societies, and simultaneously to reach for new models of transcendence, a new tolerance for androgyny, and a new role for women in social life.

The final part of Nandy’s first essay has to do with the genius of Gandhi’s critique of the psychopolitics of colonial rule. In an earlier part of this essay, Nandy discusses certain 19th-century Indian responses to colonial culture—those of Michael Madhusudan Dutt, Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, Swami Vivekananda, Ram Mohun Roy, and Bankimchandra Chatterjee. These 19th-century literati, in their critiques of India and of Hinduism, largely succumbed to the androcentric, linear, protestant, and activist strands in the dominant colonial culture.

With Gandhi, all this changes, and we see the genius of the victim in restructuring the rules of the colonial game. Nandy’s Gandhi is a critic of the West who draws on Christian, humanist, and anti-industrial values that had become marginalized in colonial culture. He was also a reformer of Hinduism who was aware that his stress on nonviolence was not necessarily a significant part of traditional Indic thought. Above all, he understood how to free activism from masculinity, courage from aggression, and political conflict from hatred. He refused to accept the false colonial opposition between myth (viewed as timeless and ever-present) and history (allegedly linear, deterministic and nonrepetitive). Nandy argues that Gandhi constructed a way of thinking in which societies gained “the option of choosing their futures here and now—without heroes, without high drama and without a constant search for originality, discontinuous changes and final victories” (p. 62). This is where Gandhi’s very contemporary critique of modernity makes him an important role model for Nandy himself.

Nandy’s second essay, “The Uncolonized Mind: A Post-Colonial View of India and the West,” is both more important and less successful than the first one. More important, because it tries to map that part of the Indian consciousness that remained insulated from the cultural contract of colonialism and retained its own shape and dynamic. Less successful, because it remains confined to the world of the well known, the elite, the articulate, the Westernized. Ironically, this essay also opens with a lengthy exegesis of the biography and personality of Kipling. In some ways, Kipling is a convenience for Nandy, because he shows so well the psychological implications of treating the West and India as “twain,” as destined to be ruler and ruled, as opposed to and exclusive of each other. Nandy presents Kipling’s personal dilemma in terms of the following view of the social and psychological harm of colonialism. On the one hand, colonialism eliminated the earlier role of the Orient as an important archetype and potentiality in the medieval European consciousness and made “Western man definitionally non-Eastern.” Westerners thus had to make a choice between being themselves and being Indian, a choice created by the conditions of colonialism.

Colonialism also created an Indian self-image that would remain in essence a Western construction. Just as the Western consciousness was made definitionally non-Oriental, the self-image of Indians was reversed:

Colonialism replaced the normal ethnocentric stereotype of the inscrutable Oriental by the pathological stereotype of the strange, primal but predictable Oriental—religious but superstitious, clever but devious, chaotically violent but effeminately cowardly. Simultaneously, colonialism created a domain of discourse where the standard mode of transgressing such stereotypes was to reverse them: superstitious but spiritual, uneducated but wise, womanly but pacific, and so on and so forth (p. 72).

In responding to such a situation, some Indians internalized the terms and discourse of the aggressor and embraced a vision of modernity that left no room for anything but their learned image of the West and the West’s constructed image of themselves. But others sought to con-
struct an idea of self and society that was less determined by the oppositions of colonial psychology, which picked up on recessive themes in the Western tradition and on marginalized themes in their own society.

It is telling that the major case that Nandy discusses of the “uncolonized mind” is Sri Aurobindo, a deeply Westernized Bengali intellectual, who became one of the most important figures in modern neo-Hinduism. The irony, as Nandy himself notes, is that Aurobindo’s own “Indian” consciousness was tortured, strange, self-conscious, and embattled, hardly qualities that Nandy would attribute to the genuinely uncolonized Indian self. Aurobindo is an unfortunate choice for Nandy’s purposes. Early in his discussion, Nandy notes that it is “a matter of judgement how far [Aurobindo’s] attempt made sense to his society and how far it remained a reductio of the West’s version of the otherwordly Indian” (p. 85). My own judgement is that Aurobindo is just such a reductio, though his struggle calls for all the compassion that Nandy brings to it.

The fact of the matter is that in this part of his analysis Nandy conflates two problems that ought to have been distinguished. One is the question of the “uncolonized mind,” that is, the consciousness, both individual and collective, of those many Indians who stayed (and still stay) largely unaffected by the modern, colonial language of resistance and of self-critique. These are the Indians who are simply Indian. The other question, to which almost all of Nandy’s examples pertain, concerns the Indian intellectual. Here we are faced with the pseudo-problem of cultural authenticity, and I believe Nandy is right in his notion that these intellectuals are no less Indian for being at the vanguard of contact with the West. That is, they represent another kind of Indianness that is self-conscious, self-made, sometimes self-destructive. Even among these Westernized intellectuals, Nandy cautions us not to exaggerate the differences between those who appear competent and aggressive in their pursuit of modern values and those who appear vulnerable, diffident, and nonmodern. These Indians represent one kind of Indian voice, and it is the sort of voice Nandy best understands and represents. It is the voice of tradition-oriented critics of tradition, of people who strive to be modern without being Western, who seek to encompass the West within an Indian ethos, to criticize India without rejecting it, and to reject the choice that damaged Kipling, the choice between India and the West.

But what about the Indian “out there,” in the villages far from the Western experience, who is not consciously embattled by the West, not torn about his Indianness, who carries on being his Indian “self” without a sense of the historical problematic in which he is unwittingly situated? Though this Indian is always in the backdrop of Nandy’s analysis, and is, in a sense, the moral fulcrum of his critique of colonial culture, it is neither the Indian whom he represents nor the one whom he best understands. Nandy’s métier is the zone of contact, the territory of mutual construction and critique, the discursive space of the colony. As to the “uncolonized mind,” it may well be a fiction, a product of the populism of intellectuals and the romanticism of the social sciences. In any case, we cannot really look for it in Nandy’s book or in his voice, for his is a study of self-conscious Indians. This is where the anthropological accounts of Khare and Daniel, which make a deliberate effort to explore the consciousness of ordinary Indians, enter the picture.

Before we turn to them, it is worth reminding ourselves of the important lessons that Nandy offers for the discussion of self-making in contemporary India. The first lesson is that we should not fall prey to the temptation—itself enshrined in colonial thought—to elect one or other kind of Indian to be the authentic one, dismissing others to various kinds of geographical, temporal, psychological or social borders. The second lesson is that the self is necessarily a political construct, forged in public discourse, located in history, carved out in debate. But Nandy’s book might tempt us to think that such politics is only to be found in modern conditions, and especially in the conditions of colonialism. But nonmodern India has its politics of the self, and not all Indians have the luxury of taking their selves for granted. Perhaps the most important example of those Indians whose battle for the self is nonmodern and non-Western comes from

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India’s untouchable castes. It is their conception of “the intimate enemy” with which Ravindra Khare is concerned.

beneath ourselves

In Ravindra Khare’s The Untouchable as Himself, we find an uncanny instantiation of Nandy’s plea for the recovery of the subordinated self. Of course, the drama here is an internal one, and the subordinated voice is the voice of India’s Untouchables, the base of the hierarchical pyramid, the historical bearers of the impurities of the upper castes, the moral victims of indigenous social theory. Khare too is concerned with politics in culture and the politics of culture. Like Nandy, he too is concerned with analyzing the drama by which cultural ideologies are constructed and debated and the process by which selves are built and voices trained in societal debate. In the weakness of Untouchables he finds insight, and in their deprivation the seeds of a radical critique of the present. When Khare asks how Untouchables turn social dependence into a strategic political resource, and how they “compose a tenable, coherent voice from within their dependent culture” (p. xi), he seems to echo Nandy’s manifesto.

Just as Nandy notes that Indian critics of colonialism played upon the differences between themselves and their rulers, using similarities to point up difference and offer resistance, so Khare sees the Chamars of Lucknow as criticizing caste society on the one hand, while identifying with certain Indic social assumptions on the other. But most of all, the resemblance to Nandy comes in Khare’s concerns with the problem of self-making under conditions of adversity. Khare’s central interest is to ask how Untouchables in today’s India go about making a positive conception of self for themselves, while simultaneously launching a deep critique of core Hindu values.

To answer this question, Khare has written an unusual ethnography, what may be called an ethnography of ideas and of ideology. He is concerned to show us the content, form, and style of a way of thinking that has been fashioned by Untouchables in order to take advantage of the opportunities for social redress afforded them by the democratic ideology of independent India. Central to their ideology is a portrait, constructed by the Untouchables themselves, of who they are and who they wish to be.

Khare’s data comes from fieldwork done over a decade in the North Indian city of Lucknow, about whose Kanya Kubja Brahman community he has eloquently written in the past. In this book, he crosses the tracks and gives us a report on the Chamars of Lucknow (part of the very large Chamar Untouchable category of northern and northwestern India). In passing he has some very telling observations to make on the process by which he gained some degree of rapport with a community to whom he must have seemed a worrisome intruder. His main indigenous sources for this account of Chamar thought and practice are intensive fieldwork in three very different Chamar neighborhoods in Lucknow; conversations with ascetics associated with the Untouchables of these three communities; the writings of various Untouchable writers, and mainly those of one Untouchable intellectual called Jigyasu with whom he clearly grew to enjoy a special relationship; and a variety of other (mainly Hindi language) publications produced by and for the Untouchable communities of north India by various sorts of publicists, polemists, and scholars from these communities. In constructing his picture of Untouchable ideology in Lucknow, therefore, Khare is able to weave back and forth between its more textualized discourse and the diverse voices of many unlettered and less articulate Chamars.

Khare’s account of who these Chamars think they are, and the theories about Indic civilization to which they lead him, has a context in previous anthropological work on the Untouchables of South Asia. Although there have been a number of fine and detailed ethnographic portraits of Untouchable communities, their status in anthropological theory mirrors their lowly role in South Asian social life. In Dumont’s argument, they are simply the moral base (in every
sense) of the hierarchical system of the castes. As Brahmans anchor the top of the system, so the Untouchables anchor the bottom. And as Brahmans produce and reproduce purity, so Untouchables are perpetual human disposal systems for the impurity of others. Dumont is, of course, not inclined to see them as harboring any critique of the caste system, and in the more recent ethnographic work of Michael Moffat (1979), the Dumontian view is logically extended, and the Untouchables of a south Indian community are seen as replicating, both ideologically and structurally, the hierarchical structure of the caste world. In contrast with these Dumontian and neo-Dumontian views, which see Untouchables as wholly captive to the dominant ideology, there is the Marxist view, articulated most sharply by Joan Mencher (1974), which sees Untouchables as wholly cynical about the ideology of the upper castes and as functioning within the system mainly because of the lack of realistic alternatives. Largely unwitting in the one account, they are wholly unwilling in the other. In both cases, the ethnography of Untouchables places them at the service of external theories. Thus, in both cases, Untouchables are fodder for scholastic battles that could equally well have been fought without dragging them in.

In Khare’s book, we see the first major effort to have Untouchables speak for themselves. This is one of the few studies to see that Untouchables not only survive and subsist, but that they do so, like the rest of us, because they have an articulate world view within which they place themselves. Further, theirs is not some lowbrow tradition or some simple variation on the larger Hindu world view, but is a subtle reworking of certain crucial civilizational principles in order to turn them into a critique of the dominant view of themselves. In turn, this ideology interacts with a complex set of pragmatic efforts by Untouchables to reproduce and improve their situations in the everyday settings of urban life. It is, of course, possible that such an articulate ideology emerges only in urban settings, and that most earlier accounts were wholly adequate to rural Untouchables (see Lynch 1969 for an important exception). But after reading Khare’s book, I am certain that rural Untouchables, at least in this century, must have more in their heads than replicating their superiors, surviving from day to day, and playing out their karmic destinies.

The conscious cultural ideology developed by the Lucknow Chamars, as Khare gives it to us, is equalitarian rather than hierarchical, individualistic rather than collectivistic and is built around the figure of the ascetic rather than that of the Brahman. Yet, as Khare is quick to point out, this equalitarianism and this individualism rest on quite different assumptions from their Western counterparts. The conception of the individual on which Untouchable ideology is based draws on a deep tradition in Indic thought that regards the individual soul as permanent and transcendental. In this view of “individuation,” the spiritual individual, not the person, is the critical unit, representing a dynamic copy of the “Universal Spirit.” This individual is in a radical sense the same as, as well as equal to, other individuals. The caste person, on the other hand, is a limited, transient entity subject to highly contingent codes and norms. This scheme brings a particular cultural conception of sameness into convergence with a specific conception of equality. Much of this scheme is present in “Hindu” thought, which Khare contrasts with the “Indic” scheme. The Untouchable construction of the “Indic” scheme encompasses (and thus critiques) the “Hindu” view, by making the link between the cosmic and the social radical and noncontingent. Thus the caste order becomes a more ephemeral, even if oppressive, one for the Untouchable ideologist while it remains much less contingent for mainstream, Brahman-centered, orthodox Hindu thought.

In constructing this pre-Hindu, Indic scheme of equality and the individual, the Untouchables of Lucknow draw on Buddhist ontology and soteriology, and also on their own version of the history of asceticism in India. The ascetic is the “individual” who best represents the Untouchable model of individuality, just as he is the guide to ordinary persons in their search for justice and liberation. Here again, the tension that the Untouchable ideology plays on is not original to them. As Dumont (1960) and others (Heesterman 1985; Madan 1982) following him...
have amply demonstrated, the ascetic, in everything he represents, is the critical counterpoint to the Brahman in Indic thought. The ascetic represents a living critique of the caste order (by subsisting outside it), of the life of the householder (by renouncing it), and of the pulls of worldly life (samsāra) by transcending them. As Dumont was the first to clearly see, the ascetic represents the “individual” in an otherwise ruthlessly hierarchical world, just as he represents the Indic conception of equality in tension with the mainstream dedication to hierarchy. The ascetic is the enemy within.

The contemporary ideology of Untouchables puts this tension to radical use, first by identifying Untouchables with this autochthonous ascetic tradition, and also by divorcing it more radically from mainstream Brahmanic thought and practice than other groups do. In the thought and writings of Jigyasu, as Khare describes them, the figure of the ascetic is the anchor for a radical civilizational critique of Brahmanic Hinduism, its multiple gods, its hierarchical social ideology, and its ritual instrumentalities. He also disassociates himself from all but a few of the sectarian traditions of medieval India, most of which were too implicated in Brahmanic ritual and social modes. He thus creates a spiritual genealogy for his tradition that is ascetic in a transsectarian mode. This unyoking of asceticism from Brahmanism on the one hand and from all varieties of socially exclusive sectarianism on the other is the distinctive feature of the Untouchable conception of the ascetic.

From this reader’s perspective, the most brilliant, and radical, move in the construction of this ideology is to identify the Untouchable with this conception of the ascetic. With this key step, instead of playing the impure foil to the Brahman, the Untouchable becomes his civilizational critic and his moral conscience. No longer a product of some sort of “karmic” Fall, the Untouchable becomes a brutalized representative of the ascetic ideal in ordinary life. His degradation and oppression are no more regarded as a just working out of the joint scheme of dharma (social law) and karma (cosmic causal law) but of the blindness of the Brahmanic social order to the axioms underlying its own existence.

By thus identifying themselves with a radical ascetic ideal, the Untouchables of Lucknow bring into the 20th century a new version of an old strand in Indic thought, which countervails the hierarchical order of Brahmanic society. But they do so in a way that continues to relate them to the mainstream (as its conscience), to Brahmans (as their moral alter egos) and to the rest of Hindu society (as the guardians of a renunciatory ideal all Hindus value). Finally, this conception of their identity allows them to anchor their current efforts to gain compensatory equality in an older, pan-Indian, and moral conception of politics. The Untouchable critique of modern life is thus what Nandy might consider a criticism of modernity from a traditional vantage point, though its current forms and expressions reflect important preoccupations in Indian democratic politics.

As Khare notes in the conclusion to his book, the articulation of Untouchable ideology raises the problem not of homo hierarchicus but of what he calls homo justus. But what this Indic version of homo justus is and how it relates to a comparative understanding of ideas about justice is something that Khare does not claim to have done any more than hint toward in this book.

This picture of Untouchable ideology, as Khare interprets it, implies a fairly radical critique of the Dumontian view of the caste system. For it constitutes both an articulate protest against the fundamental principles of hierarchy as well as a critique of it at the level of principles. This critique does not represent an eruption of what Dumont would call the domain of power into the domain of status, or of the politicoeconomic domain into the domain of religion (though it is these things as well), but it is a critique of the religious basis of hierarchy. It poses an Indic alternative to the hierarchical world, both in terms of its conception of equality and in terms of its conception of the individual. In Dumont’s own evocative usage, here is an Indic conception of equality and individuality that “encompasses” Brahmanic notions of hierarchy and social categories.
Although Khare does not elaborate the critique of Dumont implied by his material and by his interpretation, the following footnote makes it clear that he is quite aware of the implications of his argument:

Like individualism in the West (e.g. Dumont 1965, Lukes 1973), the Indic development carries its own strong assumptions. In cultural conception and expression, these are very distinct but not unique. One critical feature that could not find place with Dumont is what we have approached as everyday, ordinary representations of “spiritual”/ātāmika individuality. I do so in front of the “Durkheimian social” without embarrassment, for this construct represents not merely a mystical or esoteric ideal, but also a massive moral presence that is recurrently translated throughout the society. The translation occurs through sectarian and ritual institutions (e.g. as under sacrifice, gift-giving, hospitality, and worship) of the Indian society [p. 166].

Though to develop these observations fully would have required a whole book to itself, it is clear that Khare’s complaint about Dumont is both fair and radical. Like the Untouchables in relation to Brahmanic ideology, so Khare in his examination of Dumont finds no room for a pervasive Indian conception of equality and individuality that is not confined to its boundaries but is a pervasive part of the everyday moral life of at least some of its groups.

As far as Khare’s critique of Dumont is concerned, one might wish that he had gone further. Khare presents Untouchable ideology as very much oriented to a conception of the “whole,” even if its equalitarian and individualistic stance is, in other regards, a critique of Hindu ideology.

There are two possibilities here, and it is difficult to say on the basis of the material in Khare’s book which is the more likely one. The first is that the Untouchables of Lucknow do not see that the subtlest feature (and thus the trickiest trap) of the dominant Hindu way of thinking is the moral and ontological commitment to the “whole,” to a conception of society, action, and signification in which groups and individuals acquire significance only as “parts” in relation to “wholes.” Thus, like many critiques that come out of the same milieu as the schemes they oppose, the Untouchable critique may find this an aspect of Hindu commonsense that is hard to escape. The other possibility is that it is Khare who (like many of us) cannot escape the seductiveness of Dumont’s conception of the “whole,” which, in spite of its own roots in Western social science, converges neatly with key aspects of Hindu ideology. I shall return to the problem of the “whole” and “holism” in my conclusion.

It would not be fair to discuss Khare’s book without at least a brief mention of its second part, entitled “Pragmatic Strategies.” Though space prevents me from describing and analyzing its contents in detail, they are a crucial part of his task in the book, which is to show that the ideology that he discusses in the first part is not a mechanical and remote aspect of Untouchable life in Lucknow but is derived from and informative of their everyday experiences. Inspired in part by Pierre Bourdieu, this account of Chamar pragmatics in Lucknow is rich in cases and vignettes and reinforces the notion that this is not a socially or economically homogeneous community. It also points to the ways in which ordinary talk and understandings form the stuff of the more articulate Untouchable ideologies, while it shows how “everyday” experience is itself viewed through a set of cultural and ideological perspectives. In this more conventionally ethnographic section, we are shown how a rather fundamental and complex set of cultural critiques is instantiated in a crowded, diverse, shifting, democratic, and urban setting.

If this part of the book is somewhat less successful than Part I, it is perhaps because here, as in his previous work on food, Khare has not yet found a wholly successful way to marry cultural systems to problems of action. As with many other anthropologists, Khare’s attenuated conception of the “social” makes it difficult for him to move from the apparent systematicity and completeness of cultural systems (even conceived as ideologies) to the contingencies and idiosyncrasies of action. Still, Khare’s fascinating description of the many different kinds of ascetics who inhabit and minister to the Chamar neighborhoods of Lucknow does constitute an ethnographic glimpse of a little-known part of contemporary Indian life, and it provides the link between the radical nature of the Chamar conception of the ascetic and their everyday religious
lives in Lucknow. Khare’s strengths and priorities are reversed in the last book to be discussed, in which the perplexities of everyday life are the author’s central preoccupation and “culture” emerges from practice.

selves and signs

If Paul Theroux were to have converted to the semiotics of C. S. Peirce, and then decided to explore personhood in south India, he might have written a book much like Valentine Daniel’s *Fluid Signs: Being a Person the Tamil Way*. This witty, beautifully written, seductively theoretical book represents an original ethnographic voice in anthropology as it does a new level of analytic sophistication in South Asian ethnography. Its author is at the forefront of the recent Peirceian turn, within the semiotic branch of the cultural approach in American anthropology.

This Peirceian turn, which I regard with friendly skepticism, might be yet another effort to bring back a type of science that has always had an appeal for anthropology—the science of typology. Whether dividing societies into evolutionary types, races into genetic types, languages into phonological types, or (in various kinds of cognitive anthropology) pursuing the proclivities of other societies to typologize and categorize, we have always enjoyed typologizing, perhaps because other kinds of science seemed so hard to practice with ethnographic material. With Peirce, we have the final Borgesian typology of signs, which answers to two deep urges in American cultural anthropology in this century: the urge to typologize and the preoccupation with signification.

Happily, in Valentine Daniel’s work, there is a playful balance between rich, even riveting ethnography, and Peirce-made-easy. Every time the Tamil person threatens to be overwhelmed by the Tamil Peirceian, Daniel throws in a dose of humor or self-deprecation and returns the reader to what is best about the book, which is Daniel’s feeling for the theoretical musings of some Tamil villagers about person, village, and community and psychobiological equilibrium.

The ethnographic heart of the book is contained in five relatively self-contained essays: the first on the Tamil conception of the village (āra); the second on the relation between Tamil understandings of the house and of the person; the third on indigenous theories of sexuality and reproduction; the fourth on a local ritual of divination involving the use of flowers; the fifth involving a pilgrimage in which the anthropologist joined a group of fellow villagers, and, through a kind of ethnographer’s epiphany, experienced a very deep confirmation of his own understanding of the cultural form of semeiosis in Tamil culture.

Daniel states early, and disarmingly, that the architecture of the book, which works slowly “inwards” to the Tamil conception of the person, is an artifact of presentation. Yet he suggests that it is not a wholly arbitrary structure, for there is an indigenous logic in which territory, house, person, and cosmos interact and constitute each other. Daniel’s strategy is to articulate (ethnographically) a Tamil view of what persons are, and how they work, and then use this conception for a series of meditations on the Peirceian understanding of signs. It is clear to me that the Tamil material exemplifies some of Peirce’s distinctions very nicely. What is less clear is the degree to which his Peirceian categories helped him arrive at his analysis of Tamil culture.

Daniel uses Peirce’s distinctions between symbol, icon, and index to argue both that symbols (often talked about rather loosely in previous culture theory) are only one kind of sign and that Tamil culture seems to revolve crucially around icons and indices rather than around symbols. By extension, the boundary between metaphor and metonym in Tamil culture is subtle and easily crossed, and Daniel suggests that the Tamil language favors “metonym over metaphor and synecdoche over metonym” (p. 106). That Daniel is no mechanical typologist of signs is shown beautifully in the following passage, which precedes his detailed interpretation of the house (in Tamil culture), as being both “like” a person and, in fact, a person in certain important regards. Preempting those critics who might accuse him of overliteralizing a set of concepts...
that were intended to be merely metaphoric, and thus denying Tamils the capacity for figurative speech and thought, Daniel says:

Words in the Tamil context take a further step away from pure metaphor. In this step metonym and synecdoche are brought together, except that the former is relieved of its indexical boundedness and the latter of its symbolic conventionality. At this new crest, ridge or apex of significance, then, an unbounded metonym and a nonsymbolic synecdoche coalesce; at this point tropology ends and literality begins [p. 107].

Daniel thus provides an important semiotic insight into cultural systems, like the Tamil one, in which immense symbolic elaboration coexists with rhetoric that has the sense of the facticity of the commonplace. Daniel's very persuasive argument about the place of iconicity and indexicality in various domains of Tamil thought and discourse is richly instantiated in his treatments of such domains as sexuality, divination, and pilgrimage. These discussions generally keep theory enlivened by ethnography. But the last essay on pilgrimage occasionally threatens, in its solemn use of Peirce's ideas about Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, to veer toward unintended self-parody, though it clearly rests on a powerful and authentic field experience.

The view of the Tamil person that Daniel unfolds in his various essays, as he notes at several points, comes out of the context of the “ethnosociology” of South Asia associated with the University of Chicago throughout the 1970s, and particularly with McKim Marriott, Daniel’s teacher. This view, which has come in for a certain amount of bashing from more empirically inclined anthropologists and many Indologists, has yielded a canon of views on which Daniel represents a new, Peircean variation.

This “ethnosociology” (several examples of which are discussed and cited by Daniel) emerged originally under the influence of Schneider’s “cultural analysis” of American kinship, and in opposition to what was seen as Dumont’s “dualistic”[2] view of Hindu ideology. As articulated in a series of dissertations and articles, this approach has done much to establish the notion that South Asians do not radically separate the moral from the natural order, act from actor, person from collectivity, and everyday life from the realm of the transcendent. Especially in the writings of Marriott and Inden (Marriott 1976; Marriott and Inden 1974, 1977) the South Asian person emerged as a “fluid,” loosely bounded entity, whose concerns with regulating interpersonal transactions are part of a pervasive negotiation of biological instability and moral risk. What were previously seen as either the strictly “social” base or the narrowly “religious”[3] source of many South Asian norms were now shown to be more probably a product of culturally specific moral and biological concerns. In this light, South Asian social thought looks more Melanesian than, say, Chinese.

Much of this view has now moved into the mainstream of South Asian anthropology, though critiques and counteraccounts still characterize parts of the literature (for example, McGilvray 1982). Even Daniel, the most poetic and persuasive of the products of this school, gently chides it for its hubristic interest in ridding the observer wholly of his or her own cultural baggage. But, on the whole, Daniel’s views of the Tamil person are quite compatible with Marriott’s view of the indivisibility of the moral and the biological orders, the fluidity of biomoral substances, the salience of “individuals” (Marriott’s neologism for the active entities that compose the “individual”), and the structured variation of transactional strategies among the various castes that make up Indian society.

What is new about Daniel’s account of the constitution of the person in South Asia includes its tilt toward the pragmatic rather than the lexical dimensions of language, its sensitivity to actors who vary in their understanding of culturally defined processes, its semiotic sophistication, and—most of all—its insistence that “culture” itself is a complex act of collaboration between anthropologist and informant in the field. Here, Daniel notes his affinity with Geertz and Roy Wagner rather than with Schneider, Marriott, or many others who are even more concerned with the objectivity and verifiability of their ethnographic accounts.

is homo hierarchicus?
The Tamils in the village that Daniel calls Kalappūr are, in his view, not “individuals” but persons. Though this observation converges with Khare’s reservations about the conception of the “individual,” it comes from a different angle. The person here is viewed as a relatively unstable, unbounded entity affected by a variety of forces surrounding him. These forces are not only Durkheimian social and moral forces but are also biological and physical ones. Thus he is a very different sort of empirical and moral agent than what is implied by the Western conception of the individual. He is constituted, in a constantly open-ended and indeterminate way, by such things as the soil on which he subsists, the interaction of his “qualities” with the “qualities” of his village (ūr), his fellow villagers, the food he eats, the disposition of his humors, the configuration of the planets, the conjunction of the seasons, and his life-stage. Each of these factors, including “action” (karmam) itself has its own substantial nature (kuṇam), and thus every entity in the world (not just human persons) is involved in a complex and shifting concatenation of qualities and actions, both seen as “substances.” In this shifting concatenation, villagers seek to increase their compatibility (poruttam) with the configurations of state, quality, and activity surrounding them. Ultimately, they value such transsocial states as pilgrimage, where they strive to achieve that stability and “equipoise” that are so hard to find in the endless variability of ordinary life.

Tamils know a good deal about the qualities and natures of many things in their world, including different kinds of persons (the old and the young, men and women, different castes, people from different regions, and so forth). They also know a good deal about the constitution of the rest of the geographical world. But in a cosmos constructed as iconically and indexically as Daniel portrays, all these things and states are looked at from a “person-centered” perspective. There are relatively few context-free, objectively measurable or cognizable properties and states. This world is not only deeply iconic, but is also profoundly and happily perspectival. Much of the ordinary traffic of life—eating, procreating, building shelter, and seeking cures for disease or disability—consists of different contexts in which Tamil villagers seek, as best they can, what is most compatible with their own qualities. This elusive equilibrium is the goal they perpetually, if asymptotically, strive for. Nature (kuṇam) and action (karmam) constantly affect each other, and in orchestrating the latter and striving to better understand the former, Tamil villagers constantly make and remake their persons. The Tamil person is thus a “fluid sign” amid a plethora of such signs, operating in a world with a particular semiotic structure. It is this open-ended structure, which revolves around iconicity and metonymy, that informs the traffic of everyday life. Daniel’s book captures both the semiotic idiosyncracies and the quotidian textures of this conception of the person.

Yet, after reading Khare and Nandy, one finishes Fluid Signs with a nagging sense of unease. If the self evolves in an embattled world, if the debate surrounding personhood is in important regards political, can the pastoral quality of Daniel’s ethnography be wholly credible? He does, of course, point to a good deal of hardship, contingency, envy, suffering, and uncertainty in the lives of the villagers of Kalappūr. But this is not an account that suggests that self-making is anything but a relatively harmonious process.

The question can be put in more straightforward, even if lowbrow, forms. Do the women of Kalappūr see sexual reproduction as Devaraja (Daniel’s Vellala informant) does? What about the Untouchables of Kalappūr or its laboring castes generally? How do they see their compatibility with the soil in which they probably work not as natives or as landlords but as paid laborers? In general, what about the dispossessed, even among the Aru Nattu Vellalas, the dominant castes who form the main sociological basis of Daniel’s ethnography? Is this world view largely a Vellala construct, further inflected by the fact that a good many of Daniel’s informants appear to have been deeply affected by the experience of immigration (either their own or that of others) to Sri Lanka? Could this ethos be, in some degree, part of what Nandy might have called a “recovery of self” for some of these Vellalas after the loss of self caused by migration and its mixed blessings?
The questions I have raised might be regarded as positivist quibbles about the “typicality” of informants (or villages) or as reductive inquiries about the “real” world of conflict, coercion, and exploitation. They might thus be seen as unsympathetic to the project in which Daniel is engaged. I raise them not with “typicality” or the “real” world in mind, but rather to propose that the next stage in the sort of inquiry that Daniel has begun is to ask questions about the political economy of this Tamil semiotic. Daniel is sensitive to the debates that his presence unleashed in the village. But some of these debates are not just a product of what he calls the “polychromy” of signs. They flow from more enduring differentiations in access to the territories of the self. South Asians do not only interpret their environments, they also increasingly interrogate themselves and each other. These interrogations have a political form that we have hardly begun to investigate. When anthropologists begin such investigations, they will be protected from all manner of philistinism by the semiotic web that Daniel, and the villagers of Kalappūr, have together woven.

beyond hierarchy

Of the three authors who have been discussed, Daniel is the most explicit in his critique of the preoccupation with caste that has bedeviled South Asian anthropology. But the books by Nandy and Khare, in their different approaches to the politics of the self in South Asia, constitute significant efforts to go beyond and beneath hierarchy, and its quintessential social expression, caste—beyond it, by looking for more inclusive principles and processes, of which hierarchy is only one facet; beneath it, by exploring the phenomenology of the persons who, from time to time, behave as members of castes. These authors pose critiques of the conceptions of individuality and ideological harmony on which Dumont’s view of hierarchy is founded, but their shared preoccupation with personhood in South Asia is only one angle from which caste is, at long last, being deconstructed and reappraised.

In the study of South Asian society, the tropological hegemony of hierarchy is being loosened partly by explicit critiques and partly by the multiplication of anthropologies to which I referred at the beginning of this essay. There are signs of some very radical efforts to reconceptualize caste as a phenomenological reality and to rethink the salience of the village as a setting for social life (Schlesinger 1986). Historians, who have long been skeptical of the simplifications of anthropologists, are making increasingly sophisticated criticisms of the epistemological and methodological reification of rural life in much ethnographic work, not least in Dumont (Perlin 1985). There is a burgeoning anthropology of agriculture, in which, for the first time, we are reminded that South Asian villagers have more to worry about in their daily lives than matters of caste and ritual, narrowly construed (Harriss 1982; Leaf 1984; Attwood 1984; Mencher 1978). There is an emerging post-Dumontian understanding of the paradoxes of ideological consensus and orthodoxy in Indic religion (Eisenstadt et al. 1984). The brutal ethnic battles in Sri Lanka and the Punjab are the subject of work in progress by Valentine Daniel and Veena Das, work that will provide the basis for a wider anthropology of violence. The topic of gender has made significant progress recently (Bennett 1983; Sharma 1980). The study of the culture of modern science has created lively debates, particularly among anthropologists based in India (Übereit 1978). The cultural formation of emotional life is being analyzed not only from the point of view of the anthropology of the person but also through the study of intimacy and etiquette in micro-settings (Egnor 1985; Zwicker 1984). The anthropological study of production, commerce, and work has made some important recent strides (Holstrom 1984; Mines 1984), as has the study of the relationship between religion and commerce (Parry 1986; Rudner 1986). Finally, there are indications that anthropologists are shifting at least some of their energies to the study of metropolitan and translocal cultural forms characteristic of contemporary South Asian society (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1986).
Together, these developments (and others that I have omitted for reasons of space) augur the beginnings of a heterogeneous vision of Indian society, characterized by a multiplicity of voices and perspectives. In the short run, this heterogeneity might entail a reaction against the study of caste as such, but we will no doubt eventually return to a better, less monotonous understanding of hierarchy and caste in South Asia. It is, however, very likely that this multiplication of anthropologies is likely to signal the demise of an assumption that underlies the Dumontian way of thinking, as well as a good deal of anthropological theory in general. This is the assumption, both epistemological and methodological, of the “whole.”

**against holism**

The seductiveness of the argument of Dumont’s *Homo Hierarchicus* seems at first glance to depend on the elegance of its characterization of the ideological foundations of inequality in caste society. On further thought, it appears to enchant the reader by its sharp reflexive analysis of the preoccupation with equality and the individual in post-Enlightenment European thought. But the foundational assumption of Dumont’s conception of hierarchy (on which the rest of his argument depends) is a particular view of the relations of parts to what he calls the “whole.” It is not always clear whether Dumont is referring to an ideological, a structural, or an organizational “whole” (perhaps he means each of these some of the time). What is clear is that hierarchy, for him, is above all a matter of the subordination of parts, that is, the castes, to the “whole,” that is, the system of castes. The implications for rank, for inequality, for stratification are a contingent application of this principle. Though a great deal more could be said about the roots and implications of this part-whole conception of hierarchy, for our present purposes it is necessary only to note the centrality to the entire Dumontian edifice of the idea of a “whole” that is simultaneously social and ideological. This “whole,” which is caste society, is taken (without examination) to be complete, more important than its parts, stable, and ideologically self-sustaining.

Each of these implications is open to serious question, as the emergent anthropologies of South Asia are increasingly able to show. The work of the authors discussed in this essay, as well as that of many others (Kemper 1979; Ostor, Fruzetti, and Barnett 1982), suggests that at least one kind of “part,” the South Asian person, may provide the logical and semiotic foundation of the “whole,” the caste system, rather than vice versa. The other implications of this conception of the whole are equally suspect. Rather than being ideologically self-contained and self-sustaining, the principle of hierarchy, seen by Dumont as resting on the Hindu contrast of pure and impure, may itself be derivative from other philosophies of nature and other principles of interaction that transcend or cross-cut caste. The assumption of ideological stability and unity look equally dubious as we begin to analyze other domains of Indic life such as agriculture, gender, and metropolitan life, which are characterized by variation, by diversity, even by fashion.

It is not so much caste that has blinded us to the diversities and indeterminacies of social life in South Asia, nor is it just the Dumontian conception of hierarchy and the ideological precursors of his view. It is, rather, a particular conception of the coherence, unity, completeness, stability, and systematicity of caste, articulated most powerfully in Dumont’s conception of the “whole,” which has made it difficult to put caste in its place, however important that place might be. Yet Dumont is not the only one to rely on this idea of the “whole.” He represents only one variant of one of the most cherished slogans of modern anthropology. The sort of critique of Dumont that is now emerging ought to be one impetus toward a more general revision of the wider anthropological attachment to the idea of the “whole” and to the method of “holism.”

Holism is perhaps the most sacred of all the cows of traditional anthropological theorizing and description. Like many master concepts of normal science, its continued use depends on
its insulation from serious scrutiny. The idea of the “whole” is so deeply embedded in Western thought and its values about truth, form, and determinacy that it seems unquestionably natural. In spite of periodic critiques (from voices as diverse in space and time as Heraclitus and Foucault) it lives on, apparently as hard to relinquish as the urge to know itself. In anthropology, it has become a part of our working vocabulary, enshrined in the textbooks, so pervasive as to appear immune to critique.

The idea of holism in anthropology is a glaring example of the making of a theoretical virtue of a range of infirmities of practice, which include the limits of human observation and scientific objectivism; the hazards of the nonrepresentativeness of our small objects of study; the fiction of units of analysis that are isolable from one another; the myth of complete and uniform culture-sharing within communities; and the illusion of the transparency of ethnography. To these infirmities of practice we may add the increasingly fragile claim to completeness of the fieldwork experience, of the act of ethnographic description that follows it and of the theories that follow these (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Holism is the linchpin of a disciplinary perspective that seeks to keep these fragilities of practice (which are increasingly being recognized) at bay.

Much of what we do, as anthropologists, and much of what we find ourselves unable to do, follows from our reluctance to abandon the methodological fetish of holism. Hidden within the ideology of the “whole” is a peculiar conception of the “parts” rooted in a variety of organic as well as mechanical conceptions of “system,” which has often led to reductive structuralisms and Candidean functionalisms. The “parts” tend to be characterized by their sameness, thus preventing us from analyzing the organization of diversity as easily as we do the replication of uniformity (Wallace 1974). Ill-served by the trope of part and whole are those aspects of social life that have uneven degrees of saliency in the life of a community, which flow in complex ways into each other, and which make up indeterminate, ever-shifting configurations within and among themselves. It is, furthermore, holism that snares anthropologists in the image of the microcosm, the part that stands perfectly (if in miniature) for the whole: the person, the body, the house, the village. In each of these cases, the dominant idea of parts and wholes drives us to see parts also as wholes, complete in themselves, endlessly segmentable without distortion.

From a different point of view, it is our enduring conception of the whole that leads to the classic structure of ethnographies, in which “parts” become chapters on different dimensions of community life and the text “as a whole” aspires to that completeness and closure which is definitionally appropriate to wholes. Finally, it is the hidden pull of the idea of the whole that lies, more than any surface synchronic bias, in the incapacity of much anthropology to handle historical processes and the indeterminacies that are introduced by time into social life. History, regarded in E. P. Thompson’s terms as “the ruthless discipline of context” is the enemy of the “whole” (Perlin 1983). The idea of the “whole” (and the assumptions concerning system, structure, order, completeness, closure, and determinacy with which it is associated) may be an indispensable heuristic and methodological device. But only the systematic deconstruction of the idea of the “whole” will restore it to what, at best, it should always have been—a heuristic of order to describe a world we know always to be in flux.

In the Indian case, the study of caste, conceived erroneously as a “whole,” has retarded the development of the multiplicity of anthropologies appropriate to the diversity of social forms and contexts. Dumont’s conception of hierarchy needs to be revised and criticized because it represents the fiction of a “whole,” insulated from whatever else is outside it. Caste society may in important regards be hierarchical, but the answer to the question “Is Homo Hierarchicus?” in the light of the sort of work we have looked at in this essay, must be: yes, but not wholly so.

notes

1 Ronald Inden has been developing a critique of Orientalism in Indian studies (Inden 1986a, 1986b) [see following article—Ed.] with which I am largely in sympathy.

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This topic is discussed in a preliminary manner in Appadurai (1986). It is also the topic of a panel on “Place and Voice in Anthropological Theory” at the 1986 Meetings of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, DC.

Because the critical literature spawned by the publication of *Homo Hierarchicus* is so vast, I have not attempted to review it here, and have cited only those works which are directly relevant to my argument.

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